


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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

~~SECRET-I-A-L~~

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CASTRO SPEECH

Buoyed by the advent of Allende's regime in Chile in the wake of the governmental changes in Bolivia and Peru, Castro used his 10th Day of Pigs anniversary speech on 19 April to portray "a revolutionary wave of radicalization which is sweeping the continent and seriously threatening imperialist domination." Calling the Bay of Pigs "one of the most self-defeating events in the 195 years of U.S. history," he took the occasion to revive emphasis on the notion of an association of revolutionary Latin American states to supplant the OAS, reiterated Cuba's lack of interest in joining the OAS as it is presently constituted, and ruled out any "normalization" of Cuban relations with the United States.

At some points directly and at others indirectly, Castro responded defiantly to remarks by President Nixon about Cuba's self-isolation by virtue of its continuing export of revolution. Declaring that the 10th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs was being celebrated at a time when Cuba "is no longer alone," he defined a Cuban policy of continued support for Latin American revolutionary "governments" and "movements" -- "whatever is necessary," up to and including military support.

APPRAISES REVOLUTIONARY TRENDS, PROMISES CUBAN SUPPORT

Picturing a "qualitative change in the Latin American situation," Castro placed predictable emphasis on revolutionary trends in Chile, Peru, and Bolivia and in the process defined each country's standing in a scale of revolutionary progress.

CHILE He described Chile as "a country that is on the path of revolution, brothers in arms with our people, a people who are just beginning on the long and difficult struggle." In keeping with prior forecasts in Cuban propaganda that "reaction" would not take defeat lying down and might create difficulties that would provoke regime counteraction, he said the new Chilean regime will "logically encounter difficulties" and cited efforts by the usual culprits--the CIA, oligarchists, and reactionaries--to sabotage agricultural and industrial production and to execute various types of plots against the Popular Unity Government.

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Avowing that "we are wholeheartedly on the side of the Chilean people, and we are ready to do whatever may be necessary for them" and "to demonstrate our solidarity in any field," Castro promised that even if Chile should be unable to export goods to Cuba--as the result of imperialist and counterrevolutionary sabotage--"it will not matter; the Chilean people will never lack sugar" because "we will continue to send our sugar to the Chilean people." Further, he expansively assured the Chileans that "if there should be an aggression from abroad, planned by imperialism, millions of Cubans will be ready to go to fight for Chile."

At the beginning of his speech Castro took note of the presence of Volodia Teitelboim, member of the Political Committee of the Chilean Communist Party's Central Committee, and he concluded the speech with an injunction to Teitelboim to tell the Chilean people, the Popular Unity, and Allende's Government "that our people, unselfishly and in brotherhood with the spirit of Giron, say: When you need it you can count on our sugar, and when you need it you can count on our blood, and when you need it you can count on our lives."

PERU AND BOLIVIA Observing that "other Latin American countries are in convulsion," Castro dealt first with events in Peru. Citing specific actions of the Peruvian Government--cancellations of concessions, recovery of resources, and agrarian reform laws--he asserted that "a real change in that country's structures" is taking place and that although "one cannot speak about a Marxist-Leninist revolution in Peru, from the viewpoint of revolutionary theory one can speak objectively about a revolutionary process in Peru."

In Bolivia, where a "profound radicalization" is being observed among the Bolivian working, peasant, and student masses, Castro contended that "a revolutionary, convulsed, radicalized people" are demanding "a radical revolution." It is "our opinion," he said, "that a revolutionary process also exists in Bolivia." But he was explicitly noncommittal on the Bolivian Government, commenting that "with regard to the leadership of that process, we have not expressed our views." Cuban media's treatment of the Bolivian military regime has cooled noticeably after an initially cautious reaction to the accession of General Juan Torres to power on 7 October 1970.*

* See the TRENDS of 28 October 1970, pages 39-42.

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Summing up his view of the countries whose revolutionary or reformist regimes he portrayed as spearheading the new process of continent-wide "radicalization," Castro expressed confidence in "the Peruvian revolutionary process, in the Peruvian Government, in the Peruvian people"; in "the Chilean revolutionary process, in the Popular Unity movement, in the Chilean Government and people"; and, again pointedly, excluding the Bolivian Government, in "the Bolivian workers, students, and peasants--our confidence in the Bolivian people."

URUGUAY, BRAZIL By contrast, Castro pictured "crises" in the political systems of Uruguay, AND ARGENTINA Argentina, and Brazil and mentioned the

"revolutionary fighters" in all three countries who are "risking their lives in the underground and shedding their blood fighting oppression."

In Argentina and Brazil, he said, the regimes have "exhausted the last methods, the last actions, the last weapons, to maintain a system" and have "reached a point considered the incubus of revolution." He described the decision by the "gorilla Lanasue" to take "direct charge of the government" in Argentina as a futile effort to forestall "a revolutionary solution for the Argentine people."

Castro was notably circumspect with regard to Uruguay, neither mentioning the urban-based guerrilla group, the Tupamaros, nor alluding to the efforts to form a leftist electoral coalition on the Chilean model with Uruguayan Communist Party participation. Cuban media have reported the move to develop the electoral front and have publicized the Tupamaros' highly qualified support for the idea. They have enthusiastically publicized the exploits of the Tupamaros; as recently as 14 January, Castro described them as "revolutionaries with a great political brain who undoubtedly have plenty of support among the masses" and who "act with responsibility." Cuban comment in the past has held up the Tupamaros as a model for other revolutionaries in South America's southern cone and has claimed that their "tactical concepts" had been influenced by the Cuban revolution.

CUBAN SUPPORT Promising Cuban "support to the revolutionary governments and also support of the revolutionary movements of Latin America," Castro observed that the Cuban armed forces have acquired broad technical

knowledge and developed formidable educational institutions, predicting that "in this area, we will undoubtedly one day have the need to give technical aid to other revolutionary Latin American peoples, to give them our support, support of a technical nature." He pledged that "at the hour and moment that the other brother revolutionary countries request it, technical assistance, such as technicians or soldiers--we shall furnish them."

DENOUNCES OAS, ADVOCATES "UNION" OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES

Noting that some Latin American governments--he specified Chile's--have raised at the OAS meetings in Costa Rica "their condemnation of the aggression and the measures against Cuba," Castro was unequivocal in asserting Cuba's lack of interest in rejoining the OAS in its present form while absolving Chile of blame for working within the existing organization: "We believe that when the Chilean Government adopted the position of fighting it out with them there, it did the right thing, within its condition."

With reference to the sanctions against and censure of Cuba "by that court of bandits," Castro insisted that "morally we have never felt under censure. Morally, historically, they are the only ones under censure and, naturally, we have no intention of lifting--nor can anyone lift--these moral and historic sanctions against the imperialists and their cohorts. That is our position." He reiterated: "Now that we are outside, we feel perfectly well. We do not have to account to the imperialists, nor to the OAS." In apparent oblique response to President Nixon's recent remarks, in his February Report on U.S. Foreign Policy and during his 16 April interview with newspaper editors, on Cuba's self-isolation by virtue of its continued support for insurgency, Castro asked rhetorically:

How are they going to allow us into the OAS when we say we are on the side of the revolutionary governments? Now, when we say that the OAS causes fits of vomiting in our country--that name of the OAS, that is! Furthermore, we say publicly that we have supported, we still support, and we shall continue to support the revolutionary movements of Latin America!

While asserting again that "we do not belong nor shall we belong to the OAS" and that "historically the OAS has to disappear," Castro elaborated the notion of "a union of Latin American states" in preference to an "organization" of American states, adding that "for a union to exist, there first must be revolution in each of the Latin American countries." He explained that an economic and political "union" of the Latin American people is "a historic process," and he called on Latin American revolutionaries to "develop this internationalist or Latin Americanist sentiment as broadly as possible." He cited as examples Cuban blood given to the Peruvian people following the Peruvian earthquake and Cuban willingness "to fight together with our Chilean brothers."

IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT, REJECTS NORMALIZED TIES WITH U.S.

Responding to President Nixon's remarks on relations with Cuba in his "recent radio interview"--the 16 April interview with newspaper editors--Castro contended that the United States has "no right or basis to dream about any type of normalization of relations with Cuba and conciliation with Cuba." He argued that the President, "one of the fathers" of the Bay of Pigs invasion, was faced with "a desperate situation arising from the tremendous defeats inflicted in Indochina" and was "maneuvering internationally, seeking desperately to grasp something to save himself." As a result, "the old insolent and disrespectful language" was discarded, and the President "almost seemed to pine for a gesture from Cuba." Evoking a tacit contrast with Peking's behavior, Castro said such a gesture "will never be made."

Ticking off a long list of U.S. "responsibilities and debts toward our nation and our people" and toward many Latin American nations, Castro asked rhetorically: "What kind of normal relations or arrangements can there be between a revolutionary country such as Cuba" and "this Yankee imperialism, this genocidal government, this cop-like government, this aggressive government?" He asserted that reconciliation and normalizing of relations "with Mr. Nixon" would constitute "renouncing Cuba's solidarity with the revolutionary movements and peoples and governments," adding that "Cuba will not renounce this--we repeat this once more--will never renounce this solidarity."

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GERMANY AND BERLIN

On the eve of the 18th meeting of the four-power talks on Berlin, the Polish Government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY on 15 April carried the first acknowledgment in Soviet bloc media of the Soviet draft agreement on West Berlin presented at the previous meeting of the four ambassadors on 26 March--the first anniversary of the start of the current talks on Berlin.

The ZYCIE WARSZAWY release, in the form of an editorial commenting on information attributed to Belgian sources, has been given well-orchestrated distribution: PAP carried long excerpts on the 15th; East Berlin radios transmitted summaries and text the same day, and MEDES DEUTSCHLAND published the text on the 16th; and TASS distributed the text on the 16th in both its English and Russian international services.

So far, no mention of the Warsaw paper's editorial or of the Soviet draft has appeared in the Soviet central press, although a discussion of the editorial has been broadcast by the Moscow domestic radio: The commentators' roundtable broadcast to Soviet audiences on 18 April included remarks by TASS foreign affairs editor Gennadiy Shishkin spelling out the main points of the Soviet draft as released by ZYCIE WARSZAWY.

WARSAW EXPLAINS PUBLICITY FOR SOVIET DRAFT ON WEST BERLIN

Attributing its information to "reliable political circles in Brussels," the ZYCIE WARSZAWY editorial prefaced an outline of the Soviet draft with an apparent explanation of why Poland was leaking the contents of the document on the eve of the 18th meeting: Unnamed political observers, it said, were pinning "definite hopes" on this meeting, at which the Western allies were expected to respond to the Soviet proposal. In an obvious attempt to indicate a division among the Western allies, the editorial went on to note that "one" of the Western ambassadors had received the Soviet draft "very warmly."

In a more explicit explanation of the timing of its publicity for the Soviet draft, all but ignoring the editorial's attribution of the information to Brussels "political circles," ZYCIE WARSZAWY published on the 17th--the day after the 18th meeting of the four ambassadors--an article by its correspondent Derlatka asserting that prior to the meeting the Western side had "circulated rumors" that the Soviet proposals were

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